Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective by Knoll, Michael S
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2006 
Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax 
Perspective 
Michael S. Knoll 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and 
the Taxation-Federal Commons 
Repository Citation 
Knoll, Michael S., "Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective" (2006). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 113. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/113 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
THE SECTION 83(b) ELECTION FOR
RESTRICTED STOCK: A JOINT
TAX PERSPECTIVE
Michael S. Knoll*
I. INTRODUCTION
I N 2003, General Electric, one of the most financially SOfJhisticatedcompanies in the world, and Microsoft, by almost any measure thelargest user of equity-based pay, both announced that they would
stop granting stock options to their employees and begin to replace their
grants of employee stock options (ESOs) with grants of restricted stock. 1
Two years later, in 2005, the Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB) gave restricted stock a big boost by requiring firms that issue
ESOs to treat the market value of those options as an expense on their
financial statements. 2 Previously, public companies treated ESOs as a
costless form of compensation on their income statements, which gave
ESOs a large advantage over other forms of equity-based pay.3 FASB's
action, which had been under consideration for several years, has precipi-
tated a large scale rethinking and restructuring of equity-based pay.4
According to a July 2005 survey of 340 public and private companies by
Deloitte Consulting, seventy-five percent of survey respondents said their
companies are reducing or already have reduced the number of options
granted.s And according to Deloitte, among the eighty-nine percent of
public companies that are actively considering alternatives to ESOs,
ninety-two percent listed restricted stock as their first choice.6 Although
* Theodore Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Profes-
sor of Real Estate, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I thank Richard
Bonfatto. Dhammika Dharmapala, Mitchell Kane, Reed Shuldiner. and David Walker for
their comments and suggestions, Alvin Dong for his assistance with the research. and
Christopher Hannah for inviting me to participate in this symposium in honor of Charles
O. Galvin, the former dean of SMU's Dedman School of Law. This Article. and much of
my scholarship, follows in Dean Galvin's pioneering path of bring tax scholarship and tax
practice together. Copyright 2006 by Michael S. Knoll. All rights reserved.
1. Brian J. Hall, Transferable SlOck Options (TSOs) and the Coming Revollllioll in
Equity-Based Pay. 16 J. ApPI.IED CORP. FI '.8.8,9 (2004).
2. DELurn'E COi\:SULTING, OPTIOi'iS TAKE A Hrr, BUT WHAT WILL TAKE THEIR
PLACE'? 1 (2005), htlp://www.deJoitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/US_TMT_StockCompSur-
vey-071205v2(1).pdf.
3. fd. at 4.
4. fd.
5. ft!. at 2.
6. ft!.
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not much data has been published on the use of restricted stock, mount-
ing evidence shows that restricted stock is growing rapidly and is on its
way to becoming, along with ESOs. one of the two dominant forms of
equity-based pay.7
The most detailed data 1 have seen on restricted stock grants come
from Mercer Human Resource Consulting. 11:-1 conjunction with the Wall
Street Journal, Mercer produces an annual report on chief executive of-
ficer (CEO) compensation. For 2004, Mercer analyzed the proxy state-
ments of 350 of the largest U.S. public companies. According to Mercer,
104 CEOs received stock grants in 2002, compared to 138 in 2003 and 166
in 2004-a 59.6% jump over the period. 8 As a percentage of long-term
incentive pay (which includes stock options and performance units/shares
in addition to restricted stock), restricted stock jumped from 12% in 2002
to 20% in 2003 and increased further to 23% in 2004.9
Of course, Mercer's study is limited to CEO compensation. The data
are sparse and preliminary, but even more striking, for total grants. Ac-
cording to unpublished data provided to me by Pearl Meyer & Partners,
there has been a tenfold increase in restricted stock grants at large com-
panies from 2000 to 2005. lO Relative to the number of shares covered by
option grants, restricted stock grants still cover only about 1001c) as many
shares. I1 However, restricted shares are worth more than options on an
equivalent number of shares because there is no exercise price. Assum-
ing that a typical option grant is worth between one-third and one-half as
much as a corresponding restricted stock grant, restricted stock grants at
large companies account for about 15% to 20% of as much compensation
as ESOs.
Restricted stock is employer stock granted to an employee as part of
her compensation. Although nominally owned by the employee, the
stock is subject to the condition that if the employee leaves the firm
within a period of time, usually three years, the stock will revert to the
employer. 12 Under § 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, restricted
stock is neither taxable to the employee nor is it deductible by the em-
ployer when granted.]] Until the condition lapses and the stock vests, the
stock is considered subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, and thus not
yet taxable. 14 Only when the stock vests is the employee taxed on the
7. For evidence and arguments along these lines, see Brian J. Hall. Six Challenges in
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. ApPLIED CORP. FIN. 21,30-31 (2003).
8. WALL ST. J.lMERCEI{ HUMAN RESOURCE CONSULTING, 2005 CEO COMPENSA-
TION SURVEY AND TRENDS 2 (2005).
9. Ed.
10. Pearl Meyer & Partners. unpublished data (on file with author) (from 2004 to 2005
restricted stock grants increased from 0.01 % to 0.1 % of outstanding shares of 200 top
companies.
11. Ed. (in 2005, stock option grants were equivalent to 1.1 % of outstanding shares).
12. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL.. TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNI'iC Ap-
PROACH 221 (3d ed. 2005).
13. I.R.c. § 83(a), (c)(1), (h) (LEXIS 2006).
14. Ed. § 83(c)(1).
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grant. Once that happens, she must include in her ordinary income for
the tax year that includes the vesting date the fair market value of the
stock as of that date less any payments she made to her employer in ex-
change for the stoCk. 15 Also, only once the stock has vested does the
employer receive a deduction. 16 The employer can deduct in its tax year
that includes the vesting date the same amount that the employee
includes. 17
As stated above, the general rule in § 83(a) says that no tax conse-
quences flow from the restricted stock grant until the risk of forfeiture
lapses. There is, however, an important exception to that rule: § 83(b)
allows the employee to make an election, within thirty days of receiving
the stock, to treat the restricted stock as if it is not subject to forfeit and
thus to include it in income immediately.18 If the employee makes that
election, she includes in her ordinary income for the tax year that in-
cludes the grant date the market value of the stock (ignoring the risk of
forfeiture) as of the grant date less any payments shc made for the
stock. 19 The employee then has a basis in her shares equal to the grant
price, and any subsequent gain or loss is capital and taxed upon realiza-
tion.20 The employee then has no tax consequences if and when the stock
subsequently vests.
The employee's § 83(b) election also affects the employer. If the em-
ployee makes the election, the employer receives its deduction in the tax
year that includes the grant date. 21 Because § 83(h) provides that the
employer's deduction matches the employee's inclusion,22 the employer's
deduction equals the market value of the stock (ignoring the risk of for-
feiture) as of the grant date.23 The employer then has no tax conse-
quences if and when the stock subsequently vests. Table 1 summarizes
the tax treatments to the employer and the employee of a grant of re-
stricted stock.
As the discussion above suggests, the § 83(b) election for restricted
stock raises a range of tax planning issues for both employees and em-
ployers. So far, consultants and commentators have largely ignored these
issues. Typically they just describe the tax treatment of restricted stock
under § 83(a) and (b). Occasionally they go a little further and offer sim-
ple advice on when the election is appropriate.24 But such advice is rarely
15. Id. § 83(a).
16. Id.§83(h).
17. Id. The employer treats the stock grant as additional compensation paid to its
employee.
18. Id.§83(b).
19. Id.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978).
21. I d. § 1.83-6( a).
22. I.R.c. § 83(h).
23. fd. § 83(b).
24. See, e.g.. Jeffery S. Bortnick & Philip S. Gross. The Admlllages o{rhe 5ecrivI1 83(b)
Elecrioll Call Be Sigllif/calll, 86 J. OF l',,\X·N. 39 (1997): Albert Ellenluck. Case S£lldy: Com-
[Jllfillg {he Tax of (/ Secriol1 83( b) E/ecriol1. THE TAX A I)VISOR 471 (.July 2(02): David Kaut-
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TABLE 1
TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER
FROM GRANT OF RESTRICTED STOCK
(AT GRANT AND AT VESTING)
Section 83(a) Section 83(b)
Employee Employee is taxed when the Employee is taxed when the
stock vests at ordinary rates stock is granted at ordinary
on the excess of fair market rates on the excess of fair
value over price paid. market value over price
paid. That produces a basis
equal to fair market value:
any subsequent gain or loss
is capitaL
Employer Employer receives a tax Employer receives a tax
deduction when the stock deduction at grant in an
vests in an amount that is amount equal to the
equal to the employee's employee's inclusion.
inclusion.
based on a systematic analysis. In this Article, I develop a framework to
address the tax planning issues raised by the § 83(b) election and provide
such a systematic analysis.25
I have divided these tax planning issues into two broad categories. The
first set of issues concerns the desirability of making the § 83(b) election.
Although the statutory scheme nominally leaves the election to the em-
ployee, the employer can, as a condition of the grant, require the em-
ployee either to make or to refrain from making the election (or it can
pay the employee either to make or not to make the election). Among
the questions thereby raised by the § 83(b) election are the following:
Should employers leave to their employees the decision whether to make
the § 83(b) election? If not, should they prohibit or require the election
as a condition of the grant? If employers should not always take the
same position, under what circumstances should they take which ones?
Assuming the employee has the choice, should the employee make the
§ 83(b) election, and if so, under what circumstances? Are the interests
of the employee and the employer in making the election ever in conflict,
and if so under what circumstances? If they are in conflict, are the parties
jointly better off if the grant requires the employee to make the election,
prohibits the election, or just leaves the choice to the employee? The
answers to these questions have substantial implications for employees
ter & Lorraine Bell, Section 83(b) Election Offers Tax Planning Opportunities for
Restricted Stock, 4 J. OF TAx'N OF EMP. BI-'NI-'FITS 77 (1996).
25. My analysis in this Article is under the regular U.S. federal income tax only. I
have thus ignored the alternative minimum tax (both corporate and individual), payroll
taxes, and the possibility of cross-border transactions. I have also ignored I.R.C. § 162(m),
which prevents corporations from deducting more than $1 million in pay to any single
executive unless certain requirements are met. and I.R.c. § 409A, which imposes an addi-
tional tax on deferred compensation that does not meet its requirement. Those issues-
although potentially significant-must wait for another opportunity.
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deciding whether to make the election and for employers III designing
their grant programs.
The second group of issues concerns a real option element that arises in
connection with the § 83(b) election. Section 83(b)(2) allows the em-
ployee thirty days from the grant date to make the election.26 If the em-
ployee makes the election, she pays tax on the value of the stock as of the
grant date, not as of the election date. Thus, the employee can wait thirty
days and see what happens to her employer's stock price before deciding
whether to make the election, which is effected at old (grant date) prices.
The relevant questions here include the following: Under what circum-
stances should the employee exercise the option? How valuable is the
option to wait to the employee? How much does the option cost the
employer? And are there alternative financial contracts that could be
offered that would be more attractive to the employer and the employee
than the § 83(b) election?
In studying the tax consequences of restricted stock in general, I have
emphasized a joint tax planning approach. A joint perspective is appro-
priate-even for the § 83(b) election, which nominally belongs to the em-
ployee-because the employer designs the grant program, and thus can
decide whether to require, prohibit, or permit the election. This Article
thus follows the methodology developed by Merton Miller and Myron
Scholes.27 Surprisingly, the two most sophisticated theoretical treatments
of the § 83(b) election-Robert McDonald's 2003 working paper2K and
Scholes et al.'s, Taxes and Business Strategy29-both look at the § 83(b)
election from the perspective of the employee alone. Thus, neither one
takes the joint perspective that I do and that is appropriate here.
In addition, because the § 83(b) election has tax as well as non-tax con-
sequences, I have tried to be careful in making judgments about the tax
consequences. The method I use endeavors to make an apples-to-apples
comparison by isolating the tax consequences of the § 83(b) election. I
accomplish that by employing a heuristic device that eliminates the ef-
fects of the § 83(b) election on non-tax factors, such as before-tax cash
flow, investment, capital structure and risk. I assume that the employer
and employee engage in offsetting transactions that eliminate the non-tax
differences from making the § 83(b) election, so that the only difference
between two otherwise identical series of transactions is taxes. Only after
I have made such an apples-to-apples comparison will I discuss the tax
consequences of making the § 83(b) election when there are no offsetting
transactions.
26. See Treas. Reg. ~ 1.83-2(b).
27. Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes. ExeclIfive Compensation, Taxes, and [IlCCIl-
til'cs. ill F1NANC1/\L Fn)NOMlcs' ESSAYS 1;-'; H01\OR OF PAIJL COOTNFR 190-201 (J982).
28. Robert L. McDonald. Is It Optimal to Accelerate the Payment of Incomes Tax on
Share-Based Compensation? (Working Paper. Sept. 19.20(3). (fI'ailable at http://www.kel-
Iogg. nort hwestern. ed u/facu Ily1mcdon aId/h I mlopexe r. pd r.
29. See SCHlJl.LS LT 1\ 1... supra note 12.
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A final introductory matter remains. One planning question logically
precedes the question .of how should an employe~ desigr: its restricted
stock program to maXlITIlZe the beneftts to both lt and lts employees.
That is the question: Should the employer offer restricted stock as part of
its compensation packages? I previously addressed that question."°
Under reasonable assumptions, I showed that granting restricted stock is
at least as efficient from a tax perspective as paying additional cash com-
pensation.]] Thus, that earlier article answered the threshold question of
the desirability of using restricted stock in the affirmative, thereby setting
the stage for this Article.32
II. THE SECTION 83(b) ELECTION
Although § 83(b) vests only the employee with the power to make the
election, the employer can-as a condition of the grant-require the em-
ployee either to make or to refrain from making the election.33 The em-
ployer can also pay the employee either to make or not make the
election. Jennifer Blouin and Mary Ellen Carter have shown that the in-
clusion of such limitations on restricted stock grants, although rare, do
occur.34 Most employers, however, take a laissez-faire approach to the
§ 83(b) election.35 They neither require nor prohibit the election as a
condition of the grant, nor will they pay the employee to make or not
make the grant; they simply leave that choice to the employee.36
Surprisingly, little data exist on how many employees make the elec-
tion. The only discussions I could find were anecdotal. Robert McDon-
ald provides several examples where employees made the election.37
And David Walker states as follows:
Mature public companies and start-up companies use restricted stock
in different ways. Public companies typically make outright grants of
restricted stock to their employees as compensation, generally in
combination with or as an alternative to stock options. Only rarely
are public company employees asked to pay anything for restricted
stock, and they are virtually never asked to pay fair market value.
Here, the disadvantages of a § 83(b) election-immediate taxation
and risk of forfeiture and non-recovery of tax-loom large, and the
election is rarely made. By contrast, early stage start-up companies
often sell shares to key employees at a nominal value, which can be
argued to be the fair market value of the stock in the fledgling ven-
30. See generally Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation,
103 TAX NOTES 203 (2004).
31. ld. at 210,
32. See also David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advanraged? 84 S.U, L.
REV. 695 (2004) (reaching a similar conclusion).
33. See Jennifer L. Blouin & Mary Ellen Carter, Restricted Stock and Section 83(bJ
Elections 3 (Working Paper, June 2006).
34. ld. at 12-13.
35. ld.
36. ld,
37. McDonald, supra note 28, at 2-3.
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ture. Thus, employees of start-ups can make a § 83(b) election and
incur little or no current tax, and they generally do. 38
The rest of this part focuses on whether it is in the joint interest of the
employer and the employee for the employee to make the election. The
argument proceeds in stages. I first consider a base case with numerous
simplifying assumptions, and then I relax those assumptions.
A. THE BASE CASE
I start with the following simplifying assumptions: Consider a public
company with income tax rate, t, that is assumed (for now) to be constant
over time. The company grants an employee one share of stock, which
she will forfeit back to the company if she leaves its employ before it
vests. Denote the date of the grant as T=O, and the date the share will
vest as T=1. Denote the price of the employer's stock at the time of the
grant as Po and at the time the grant vests as Pl. The stock does not pay
dividends. Assume that the employee has a personal tax rate on ordinary
income of tp, a personal tax rate on long-term capital gains of teG, and that
both tax rates are assumed (for now) to remain constant over time.39
1. Employer
To simplify the discussion, I have generally assumed throughout this
Article that the employer and the employee close out their transactions at
the vesting date.40 The employee sells her restricted stock at that time,
and the employer repurchases it. Consider the employer first. If the em-
ployee does not make the election, when the stock vests the employer will
have one additional share outstanding (assuming that the employee did
not forfeit her share). In addition, until vesting there will have been no
tax consequences and thus no cash flow consequences to the employer
from the grant. When the shares vest, the employer deducts the current
market value of the granted stock (P1), which reduces its tax liability by
IPl , and pays P j to repurchase the stock. Denote the after-tax cash that
the employer has at vesting as a result of the grant when the employee
does not make the election by Ci%. The superscript N is used to indicate
that there is no election (a superscript E will be used when there is an
election) and the subscript ER is used to denote the employer (a sub-
script ee will be used for the employee). Thus, the employer's after-tax
cash at vesting when the employee does not make the election is given by
the following expression:
C'XR = -(l-I)P],
where the minus sign indicates an outflow of cash.
(1 )
38. Walker. supra note 32, al 707 (citalions omitted).
39. Later on. I relax the assumption of constant tax rates.
40. lllis assumption is not necessary to reach the results I reporl. hut it simplifies hoth
the arithmt:tic and the exposition. In addition. it is straightforward how to adjust the for-
mulas for a later disposition.
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Alternatively, if the employee makes the § 83(b) election, the employer
will receive an immediate deduction equal to the market price of one
share. Thus, at the grant date, the employer will receive a deduction of
Po, which will reduce its current taxes by tPo. The employer's cash flow at
vesting will depend in part on how it invests its tax savings. Denote the
employer's after-tax return on its tax saving by x. At vesting, the em-
ployer will have cash on hand as a result of the grant of tPo (1 + x). It will
also cost the employer PI to repurchase the share. Thus, the employer's
cash outflow at vesting if the employee makes the election, CE~, is as
follows:
(2)
A simple comparison of equations (1) and (2) illustrates the logic un-
derlying the frequent observation of commentators and consultants that
the employer is worse off as a result of the election if its stock has in-
creased sharply and better off if it has fallen or risen only slightly.41 Al-
though that observation is accurate, as far as it goes, it cannot justify the
conclusion-often advanced-that the election hurts the employer if the
price of its stock rises substantially. That is because the employer can
easily neutralize the tax and non-tax effects of the employee's election by
investing its tax savings in its own stock.42 If the employer then sells that
stock at vesting, it will be in exactly the same position as it would have
been if the employee had not made the election.43
Accordingly, assume that the employee makes a § 83(b) election and
the employer purchases t shares of its own stock with a cash inflow from
the election of tPO.44 When the restricted shares vest, the employer sells
the purchased shares for tP I • Section 1032 provides that a corporation is
not taxed on the gain or loss it realizes from dealings in its own stock.45
Thus, after the sale, the employer has additional cash of tP I • Also, at
vesting, the employer repurchases the share it previously granted its em-
ployee at a cost of -Pl' The net out-of-pocket cost to the employer then
is -(1-t)P" which is also the amount given by equation (1). It therefore
follows that the employer's cash flow is unaffected by the employee's de-
cision whether to make the § 83(b) election.46
41. The employer is hurt by the employee's election (CJ:~ > CIk) if the employer's
stock price over the vesting period rises faster than the investment the employer makes
with the tax savings generated by the election, PI > Po (l+x). Conversely, the employer
benefits from the election (ClR > CE~) if its stock price does not rise as fast as its invest-
ment, Pl. < PI1 (l+x-).
42. T11e discussion in this part ignores the possibility that the stock has appreciated
between the grant date and the exercise date. That possibility is taken up in Part III, inFo.
43. If the employer invests in its own stock, its return x will be (PI-Po)/Po. Substituting
that expression for x, equation (2) simplifies into equation (1).
44. Because I assume that the employer grants the employee one share of stock, the
purchase of I shares is necessarily the purchase of a fraction of a share. More generally, if
the employer grants the employee n shares, the employer would purchase nt shares.
45. LR.C. § 1032(a) (2005).
46. The non-tax consequences are also the same with and without the election because
the employer has outstanding l-t net shares. Without the election, the employer has one
share outstanding to its employee and a future deduction worth t shares. With the election,
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An example might help to illuminate the intuition. Suppose Max Co.
grants Ruby 100 shares of restricted Max Co. stock on July 1, 2004, when
Max CO.'s stock price is $10 a share. The shares vest on July 1,2007. Max
Co.'s tax rate is 35%; Ruby's tax rates are 35% on ordinary income and
15 % on capital gains. If Ruby does not make the § 83(b) election, Max
Co. is entitled to a deduction equal to the market value of 35 shares of
Max Co. stock when the grant vests on July 1, 2007. Thus, if Max Co.
repurchases 100 shares at that date, it will be out-of-pocket the price of 65
shares. (That is true regardless of the price of Max CO.'s stock on that
date.) Alternatively, if Ruby makes the § 83(b) election, then Max Co.
receives a $1000 deduction in 2004 that reduces its taxes by $350. Max
Co. can then offset the effect of Ruby's election on its cash flow by using
the $350 to purchase 35 shares of Max Co. stock. Max Co. then will have
100 shares outstanding from the grant and 35 shares in its treasury (which
shares are outstanding when Ruby does not make the election). Upon
vesting, Max Co. can repurchase 65 shares in the market. The cash flow
consequences to Max Co. are therefore the same whether or not Ruby
makes the election regardless of Max CO.'s stock price at vesting.
Two results follow from the above demonstration that the employer
can neutralize the tax consequences of the employee's election. First, the
received wisdom-that the election hurts the employer if its stock price
rises substantially over the vesting period, and conversely-is wrong.
The election generally has no effect on the employer. Second, the overall
tax efficiency of the § 83(b) election generally depends only upon the tax
consequences to the employee.
2. Employee
Turning now to the employee, assume she does not make the § 83(b)
election. There are then no cash flow consequences to the employee at
grant. At vesting, she will pay tax of tpP j • If she sells her stock immedi-
ately after vesting, she will receive Pl. Thus, the employee's after-tax
cash at vesting when she does not make the election is given by:
(3)
Alternatively, if she makes the § 83(b) election, she will pay tax of [ppo
at grant, and she will have a basis of Po in her one share. If she sells her
share at vesting, receiving income of Ph she will pay capital gains taxes on
the appreciation that occurs from grant to vesting, -tcc(P j -PO),47 and so
her after-tax cash is given by:
e'L = (1-[u;)P I + {ccPo. (4)
thc employer has one share outstanding to its employee. but t fewer shares outstanding to
other invcslOrs.
47. If she does not sell the stock then. hut at a later date, the qualitative results are
unchanged except that thc effective capital g.ains tax rate as of the vesting date replaces the
statutory capital gains lax ratc.
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Although tempting, it would not be appropriate to draw any conclusions
about the desirability of the § 83(b) election by comparing equations (3)
and (4). That is because the employee has a cash outflow at grant with
the election-equation (4)-but no corresponding outflow with no elec-
tion-equation (3).
In order to match the cash flow at grant when she does not make the
election to the cash flow when she does make the election, the non-elect-
ing employee must do something with the cash that the electing employee
uses to pay her taxes.48 Assume the non-electing employee deposits in a
bank account all of the money the electing employee uses to pay the tax
due as a result of the election. Assume further that the non-electing em-
ployee liquidates that account when the grant vests. Also, assume an af-
ter-tax interest rate of r. At vesting, then, the non-electing employee
receives t pPo(1 +r) when she liquidates her bank account. She also sells
her share immediately after it vests, paying ordinary income tax on the
value of the stock at vesting. Thus, upon sale, the non-electing employee
will pay tax of tpP j • Hence, as a result of the grant, the non-electing em-
ployee will have the same cash flow consequences at the grant date as the
electing employee. Upon sale, the non-electing employee's after-tax cash
flow as a result of the grant is as follows:
c~'£ = (l-tp)P I + t,,po(1 + r), (5)
where the superscript A following the superscript N indicates that an ad-
justment at the grant date was made so that the cash flow at grant with no
election (N) equals the cash flow at grant with the election (E). Specifi-
cally, in equation (5) the adjustment is for the non-electing employee to
deposit in a bank account all of the proceeds she would have used to pay
the tax if she had made the election.
Whether the employee is better off making the election is still unclear.
Her wealth depends upon the stock price (PI) at vesting. For high prices
she is better off with the election, but for low prices she is better off with-
out it.49 Does that mean that she should make the election if she expects
a substantial increase in price? Not necessarily. 50
That is because the economics of the two transactions are not
equivalent. Most noticeably, the employee who has made the election
has increased her exposure to her employer's stock. In order to quantify
48. In effect, a simple comparison of equations (3) and (4) implicitly assumes that the
non-electing employee discards cash on the grant datc equal to the cost of the election.
49. The employee's wealth at vesting if she makes the election-equation (4)-ex-
ceeds hcr wealth if she does not make the election and deposits the difference in a bank
account-equation (5) - when PI > [(tp(l+r»-lcc)/(tp-tcc)]Po
50. Equation (5) is similar to the models recently developed by Kenneth Anderson
and John Goldsbury. Kenneth Anderson, The 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Deci-
sion Framework, J. OF FIN. SERVICES PROF. 59 (Sept. 2004); John Goldsbury, The Myth of
the R3(b) Election, 21 J. OF TAX'N OF INVESTMENTS 300 (2004). However, in contrast with
Anderson and Goldsbury, who developed their models to assist employees in deciding
whether to make the § 83(b) election, I argue below that employees should not use equa-
tion (5) in deciding whether to make the election.
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the tax consequences of the election to the employee, the non-tax conse-
quences of the election must first be eliminated.
Start with the number of shares the employee owns at the grant date.
How many shares does she own? That might seem like a silly question,
with an obvious answer of one share whether the employee makes the
election or not. The question is actually more subtle, and the answer is
not always one. Consider first what happens if the employee makes the
election. The employee holds one share of stock with a basis of Po. As
the market value of the share changes, the employee's portfolio changes
in value. If she were to sell her share, she would have Po plus the product
of (l-tce) and any change in price over the vesting period (PI-PO)' On an
after-tax basis, the employee's exposure to her employer's stock is $(1-
tce) for each $1 change in price. That is the same exposure as has an
individual who purchases one share of her employer's stock on her per-
sonal account for Po (and holds that share for more than one year, so any
gain or loss is long-term capital). Thus, the electing employee's position
is equivalent to owning one share with basis Po.
Consider now the employee who did not make the election. She also
nominally holds one share, but without any basis. Assuming she does not
forfeit the stock, then at vesting, she will owe tax of tpP j • She does not
have the same exposure to price changes as the electing employee. For
the non-electing employee, each one dollar change in the price of her
employer's stock translates into only an additional $(I-tp) after tax, not
$(I-tce).
We could describe the non-electing employee's stock ownership in two
ways. First, and most intuitively, we could say that the employee owns
(l-tp ) shares that are not subject to further tax until vesting.51 Her posi-
tion in her company's stock then is the same as holding (l-tp ) shares in a
Roth IRA and withdrawing those shares at the vesting date. 52 Second,
we could describe the non-electing employee's stock ownership in terms
of an investor who bought the employer's shares on personal account at a
share price of Po. Compared to such a shareholder, the non-electing em-
ployee holds the equivalent of (l-tp)/(I-tce) shares. That is because an
investor who purchased (l-tp )/(I-tce) shares at Po would see her after-tax
wealth increase by (l-l F ) for each dollar increase in stock price.53 In con-
trast to such a purchaser, however, the non-electing employee has a basis
of 0 in her shares.54 Thus, at vesting, the non-electing employee will re-
ceive [Cl-tp)tu /(1-lce)]Po less than the purchaser of Cl-tp)/(I-tc c;) shares.
51. Any gains or loses thai occur on her 1-/1' shares after vesting would be subjeci 10
lax as capital gain or loss.
52. That is. of course. equivalent to holding 1 share in a regular individual retirement
account ("'IRA") and being subject to an ordinary income lax rate of II" That equivalence
assumes that the taxpayer will withdraw her employer stock from hath IRA accounts at the
same date (vesting date) and that her tax rate is the same at hoth grant and vesting dates.
53. 1l1e denominator renects the capital gains lax thaI the purchaser would pay when
she sells her shares (assumed to be at the vesling dale).
54. A purchaser \.vho purchased (1-lp)/(I-lcr;) shares al a price of Po per share would
have a hasis of !(1-I,,)/(I-I(dJPfj in her shares.
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In other words, the non-electing employee can be viewed as owning (1-
tp)/(l-t((;) shares and owing [(l-tl')tcc;/(l-tc(;)]Po at vesting.
In effect, then, by making the election, the employee has increased her
exposure to changes in the price of her employer's stock. Before the
election she would earn 1-tp after-tax dollars for each dollar change in
price. After the election that figure rises to I-tCC;. Although the election
does not change the number of shares she legally owns (one), it does
change her economic exposure. The employee economically owns more
stock after the election (one share) than before ((l-tp)/(l-tcd shares).
Although it is usually not phrased this way, from the employee's perspec-
tive, the election is equivalent to purchasing additional shares of the em-
ployer's stock. In effect, the employee, by making the election, has
purchased (tp - tcc;)/(l-tc-c;) additional shares. The election then is more
than a tax decision. It is also an investment decision, with the attendant
cash flow and risk exposure consequences that an additional investment
by the employee in her employer's stock ordinarily entails.55 Expressed
differently, the employee, through the election, increases her economic
ownership of her employer's stock even though she holds title to the
same one share both before and after the election.56
Because the election has non-tax consequences, the tax consequences
of the election cannot be gleaned without first equalizing the employee's
economic investment in her employer's stock. Instead of purchasing
(tr - tcc;)/(l-tcc;) shares indirectly, through the election, the employee
could have purchased those shares directly in the market. Buying the
additional shares directly would have cost her [(tp-tcc;)/(l-tcc;)] Po, which
is less than the cost of the election {[Po.57 With the election, the employee
will have cash of (l-tedP , if she sells her shares at vesting. Without the
election, but with the purchase of additional shares, she will also have
cash from the sale of all of her shares of (l-tcc)P l • However, because the
election was more expensive than the purchase of additional shares, she
will also have cash left if she does not make the election. That cash is
[tec(1-tp)/(1-tcc;)]Po.5R If she puts that cash under her mattress, she will
have the same amount of cash at vesting (after selling her stock), regard-
less of the price of her employer's stock at that date.59 In that case,
55. For a typical employee, who is already too heavily invested in her employer, these
non-tax consequences are likely to be mostly negative.
56. Obviously, there would be no reason for the employee to make the election if
there was no capital gains preference, II' =: ICG, and the increased exposure would be great-
est if I cG =: O. As long as there is a capital gain preference, tp > tCG , the election increases the
employee's exposure.
57. The inequality holds when the individual tax rate on ordinary income is less than
100% (tp<l) and when there is a capital gain preference for individuals (O<lcG< tp ).
58. Given current statutory tax rates, in order to match her economic exposure from
the election, the employee will have to purchase 0.24 [=: (35%-15%)/(1-15%)] shares. The
cost to the employee of purchasing these additional shares is 0.24Po. That is less than the
cost to the employee of making the election, 0.35Po. That leaves the employee who does
not make the election with an additional O.lIPo to invest.
59. The equivalence of the two positions can be demonstrated as follows: If the em-
ployee makes the election and sells her stock when it vests, she will receive PI, pay taxes of
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whether she makes the election or not, her after-tax wealth will be
C:e = (I-tcc)P t + IccPo, which is equation (4).
Of course, the non-electing employee can make a better investment
with her excess cash than to stuff it under her mattress. If she simply
deposits her excess cash in a bank account until the vesting date, her af-
ter-tax wealth at vesting will be:
eN,A'EE (6)
where the superscript A' after the superscript N indicates that the non-
electing employee's cash flow at grant and her exposure to her em-
ployer's stock are matched to the cash flow and exposure of the electing
employee (E).
The difference then between equations (4) and (6) is the difference in
the employee's after-tax wealth from making the § 83(b) election as com-
pared with not making the election. The electing employee will have ad-
ditional cash, denoted ,6., at vesting as follows:
(7)
which is always negative (for tax rates below 100 percent). Expressed in
words, the non-electing employee's after-tax cash flow exceeds the elect-
ing employee's by the after-tax interest the non-electing employee earns
on her incremental investment. That is to say, the cost of the election is
the cost of tying up capital that could otherwise be invested and generate
a return. What therefore follows is that even if the employee wants to
increase her holdings of her employer's stock, she still should not make a
§ 83(b) election. She has a dominant strategy that involves purchasing
additional stock.6o
The intuition for why the election hurts the employee is most easily
grasped by going back to the more intuitive of the two answers to the
question how many shares does the non-electing employee hold. That
In; (P I- Po) and be left with ()-lcc)P I + fCG Po. If she does not make the election and sells
all of her shares when her original share vests, she will receive PI for her original share and
pay taxes of I"PI • She will also sell (f,,-luJ/(l-tcc) shares for [(t,,-tcc;)/(l-f(c)] PI and pay
taxes of fCG [((,,-fcd/(1-tec)] (PI-PO), leaving her with (I-fed PI + [tCG (1,,-lec)/(1-tcc)] Po.
Added to that is [ICG (1-fp )/(1-fec)] Pu that she has in her mattress. Together. if she does
not make the ejection, but instead buys additional shares, she has (l-fcc) PI + feG Po, ex-
actly what she has when she makes the election.
60. 1n theory. instead of assuming that the non-electing employee purchases additional
shares, I could have assumed that the electing employee sells shares short. That would
match the non-tax consequences of making the election to those of not making the elec-
tion. In the text. I match the non-lax consequences of not making the election to those of
making the election. I did not use the short sale for several reasons. First, many firms
discourage employees from engaging in short sales. Second. the transaction costs for short
sales can be large. Third. there is a possible tax arbitrage from shorting and holding the
same stock if the short side receives ordinary treatment and the long side receives capital
treatment. That possibility has led to the development of anti-abuse rules for short sales
that complicate the tax analysis. Because of those anti-abuse rules. the tax consequences
of the election are not heing isolated from those of the anti-abuse rule. If, however. the
short side receives lhe sam~ capital treatment as the IOJlI2 side. then the election with a
short sale could he cOlllpared t~) not lll<1king the election.
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answer was that the electing employee"s position is equivalent to owning
(l-tf-') shares that are not subject to tax (until vesting).bl
Using that intuition, the election converts the employee's investment in
(l-t p) shares of employer stock that is free from tax until vesting into an
investment in one share of stock that is taxable at the employee's capital
gains tax ratc on any subsequent price changes. Expressed differently,
the election has two effects. First, through the election, the employee has
increased her investment in her employer's stock by tp shares, from (l~tp)
shares to one share. Thus, given a current ordinary income tax rate of
35%, by making the election the employee increased her investment in
employer stock by 0.35 shares, from 0.65 shares to one share.
Second-and this is key-the election changed the tax treatment of the
employee's original investment. Without the election, the employee
would have held (l-t p ) shares that would not have been subject to tax on
any price changes that occurred before vesting. With the election, those
(l-tp ) shares are now subject to tax at the long-term capital gains rate of
tCG on such price changes. Thus, the net cost of the election is the differ-
ence between holding (l-tp) shares tax free un til vesting com pared with
holding the same shares subject to capital gains taxes. Denote the ex-
pected before-tax rate of return by R and assume the employee cashes
out her investments at vesting. The electing employee will have addi-
tional cash at vesting in the following amount:
(8)
which is negative (for tax rates below 100%). In words, the cost to the
employee of the election is that she converts the return, R, on the after-
tax grant, (l-tp)Po, from being untaxed into being taxed at the capital
gains tax rate, tCG . Therefore, in the base case, the election is inefficient
for the employee and employer taken together because it imposes capital
gains taxes on the employee's gain on the original grant until vesting,
which gain would have escaped tax had the employee not made the
election.62
Returning to the earlier numerical example, if Ruby makes the § 83(b)
election she pays $350 tax and has 100 shares with a $1,000 basis. To
match her exposure from the election, Ruby purchases 23.529 shares at a
61. Note that the employee's exemption from tax on price changes prior to vesting is
an application of the widely recognized result that an immediate deduction of the cost of
the investment followed by a later inclusion of the investment's full amount is equivalent to
exemption of the return on the investment. In effect, § 83(a) can be seen as permitting the
employee to take a deduction of Po at the grant date and an inclusion of PI at the vesting
date. The former offsets an equivalent deduction.
62. Although it is not apparent, these two ways of expressing the cost of the election-
equations (7) and (8)-are equivalent. In equilibrium, the after-tax return, r, should equal
to the product of the before-tax return and one minus the capital gains tax rate, (l-tee)R.
That is to say, r = (l-tec)R. Substituting rI(l-tee) for R into equation (8) yields t:,. = [tee
(l-tp)/(l-tee)] Po r, which is equation (7). Thus, the two ways of expressing the tax disad-
vantage from making the election are equivalent.
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cost of $235.29.63 That leaves her with $114.71 to invest that she does not
have if she makes the election. Assume that the investment generates
after-tax interest at the rate of 10% over the vesting period, which comes
to $11.47. Below, I consider two possible scenarios for Max Co.'s stock
price, and I show that Ruby will have $11.47 more at vesting by not mak-
ing the election regardless of what happens to Max CO.'s stock.
Consider first the possibility that Max CO.'s stock increases tenfold to
$100 a share at vesting. If Ruby made the election, she will sell her 100
shares for $10,000, pay $1350 in tax, and so be left with $8,650. Alterna-
tively, if Ruby did not make the election, but instead used part of the
$350 to purchase additional shares and deposited the rest in the bank,
then Ruby still sells the original 100 shares for $10,000 and now pays
$3,500 tax. Ruby also sells the additional 23-plus shares for $2,352.94,
and pays tax upon sale of $317.65. Ruby also has $114.71 in principal in
her account and an additional $11.47 in interest. Thus, Ruby has $8661.47
in total, exactly $11.47 more than when she made the election.
Consider now the possibility that Max Co. 's stock falls to one tenth its
grant price, or $1 a share. If Ruby made the election, she will sell 100
shares for $100, receive a capital loss that is worth $135, and thus end up
with $235. Alternatively, if Ruby did not make the election, but followed
the strategy outlined above, she would sell her original 100 shares for
$100, pay $35 in tax, sell her additional 23-plus shares for $23.53, and
receive a capital loss that is worth $31.76. Ruby also has $114.71 in prin-
cipal in the bank and $11.47 in after-tax interest. Thus, Ruby has $246.47,
which is again exactly $11.47 more than what she has if she makes the
election.
As the example above suggests, the cost to the employee of the elec-
tion is not affected by the appreciation or depreciation of the employer's
stock over the vesting period. The per share cost to the employee of
making the election is given by multiplying the cost of the election for
one share, equation (7), by the number of shares granted (n). Thus, the
cost is a function of the number of shares granted (n), the employee's
ordinary (tp) and capital gains tax rates (tcc), and the after-tax interest
rate over the vesting period (1').64 The intuition is that the cost of the
election is the after-tax interest that the employee can earn on the funds
she does not have to invest in the employer's stock in order to match the
increased exposure from the election, but that she must otherwise hold
aside in order to match the cash flow at vesting. At current tax rates, that
amount is about 11.5% of the market price of the restricted stock granted
to the employee.65 As of March 2006, municipal bonds (with very low
risk of default) pay interest (exempt from federal taxes) at an annual rate
63. The 23.529 shares are calculated as follows: 23.529 = [(II'-fcc;)!
(J -1(;)] 100=[(0.35-0.15)/(1-0.15)]J 00.
M. The after-tax interest over the vesting. period (r) is a function of both the periodic
after-tax interesl rate and the vesting period.
65. Calculated with a personal income !i1X rate of 35'Yo and a capital gains tax rale of
15 ()!<,.
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of about 3.4 %. Returning to the example, the cost of the election, both in
dollars and as a percent of the value of the grant ($1,000), are given in the
following table.
TABLE 2
THE COST OF THE SECTION 83(B) ELECTION
(AS A FUNCTION OF THE TIME TO VESTING)
Years 1 2 3 4 5
Value as Percent of Grant -0.39% -0.79% -1.21% ~1.64% -2.()9%
Valuc in Dollars ~$3.90 -$7.93 ~$12.10 -$16.41 -$20.87
Years 6 7 8 9 10
Value as Percent of Grant ~2.55% -3.02% -3.52% -4.03% --4.55'1'0
Value in Dollars -$25.48 -$30.25 -$35.18 ~$40.27 -$45.54
Negative numbers are the cost of the election; positive numbers (if there were any) would
indicate a benefit.
Negative numbers are the cost of the election; positive numbers (if there
were any) would indicate a benefit.
Although most of the amounts in Table 2 seem small on a $1,000 grant,
the table makes clear that the election is always costly. Moreover, Table
2 makes clear that the cost of making the election increases at an increas-
ing rate as the time to vesting increases.
B. EXTENSIONS
The discussion and results described above-that the employee's
§ 83(b) election has no impact on the employer because the employer can
neutralize the effect of the § 83(b) election by using its tax savings to
purchase shares, but that the election increases the employee's taxes be-
cause she can do better by purchasing shares than by making the elec-
tion-were for the base case. The assumptions that define that case are
as follows: the employer's stock is publicly traded; both the employer's
and employee's tax rates are constant over time; the employee pays noth-
ing to the employer for the restricted stock;66 the stock does not pay divi-
dends; and the employee does not subsequently forfeit the stock back to
the employer. These assumptions are likely accurate in many circum-
stances. However, when they are not accurate, the above results do not
necessarily hold. To some of these issues I now turn.
66. Robert McDonald discusses this issue from the employee's perspective and con-
cludes that the higher the portion of the market price paid by the employee, the greater the
incentive for the employee to make the ejection. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 7. Later
on, in subpart II.BA, I consider the effect of explicit payments for the stock on the § 83(b)
election.
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1. Changing Tax Rates
In the base case, I assumed that both the employee's and the em-
ployer's tax rate are constant over the vesting period. I then used that
assumption to reach the conclusion that the § 83(b) election is inefficient
because it increases the employee's taxes and has no impact on the em-
ployer's. When tax rates change over time, those conclusions do not nec-
essarily follow. Under some circumstances, the election can be jointly
efficient as shown below.
Start with the employer. When the employer's tax rate changes be-
tween grant and vesting, the employer's wealth is affected by the § 83(b)
election because it can no longer offset the effect of the election by using
the proceeds generated by that election to purchase additional shares. If
the employee does not make the election, then at vesting, the employer
will receive a deduction worth t 1Ft, where t] is the corporate tax rate at
vesting. If the employee makes the § 83(b) election, the employer will
receive an immediate deduction worth toPo, where to is the corporate tax
rate at grant. If the employer then uses those proceeds to repurchase its
own stock, it can buy to shares. If it sells those shares when the grant
vests, it will receive toP}, no portion of which is taxed. Therefore, the
difference in the employer's wealth if the employee makes the election is
(tl-to)?j. Thus, if the employer's tax rate rises over time (t l > to), it is hurt
by the election, regardless of what happens to the price of the employer's
stock.67 On the other hand, if the employer's tax rate falls over the vest-
ing period (to > (1), it benefits from the election.6s
\\Then the employee's tax rate is constant and the employer's is rising,
then both the employee and the employer are harmed by the election. In
that case, the employee is unlikely to make the election and there is prob-
ably little need for the employer to prevent it. When, however. the em-
ployee's tax rate is constant and the employer's is falling, then the
employer is better off with the election, whereas the employee is worse
off. Moreover, if the expected decrease in the employer's tax rate is large
enough, then the employer's gain will exceed the employee's loss, and so
there will be a joint tax benefit from the election. However, in such cir-
cumstances, the employee would not voluntarily make the election. 111LIS.
if the employer wants the employee to make the election, the employer
must either require the employee to make the election as a condition of
the grant or pay the employee to make it.69
67. If the employer's tax rate rises, it will receive less money when it sells the shares it
purchased with its tax savings from the election. t{,P], than it would have received if the
employee did not make the election, rJ:J I • In such a case. the employer's loss from the
election is (to-rl) PI.
68. If the employer's tax rate falls. it can sell the stock it purchased with the proceeds
of the election. toP,. for marc than the deduction would have been worth at the vesting
date. rIP" and so the employer is ahead by (ro-t,)P:.
69. The text describes the net tax benefit (or cost) to the employee of electing as of the
vesting dale. The election however must be made within thirty clays of the grant date.
which~is well before the stock vests. Thus. measured as of the' grain date. th'C certainty
equivalent benefit to the employer of the el~ction ean be rewrilte~ as (1+r)(ll-lIJ)Po, where
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The effects of a change in the employee's tax rate are in the opposite
direction of those of the employer. Accordingly, the election is more at-
tractive to the employee when her ordinary tax rate falls, and less attrac-
tive when it rises.7° The impact on the employee is also more
complicated because the election in the base case harms the employee,
but not the employer. Thus, in order for the election to become attractive
to the employee her tax rate must rise substantially. When only the em-
ployee's tax rate is changing, the costs and benefits of the election are
internalized to the employee and so she has the proper incentives to
make the election. When, however, the employer's tax rate is also chang-
ing, the incentives are not all internalized.
2. Restricted Stock Units
The discussion so far has been for restricted stock. Some firms, includ-
ing Microsoft, have taken to issuing restricted stock units to their employ-
ees.7 1 Restricted stock units differ from restricted stock in that the
employer does not initially transfer shares to its employees. Instead, the
employer makes an unfunded and unsecured promise to provide the
shares at a specific date (delivery date), subsequent to the vesting date if
those shares vest. Restricted stock units are thus unfunded, unsecured
promises to deliver property in the future. They are therefore taxed
under the rules that apply to other non-qualified deferred compensa-
tion.72 As such, the employee includes the value of her shares in ordinary
income when she takes delivery, and, at that time, the employer deducts
the same amount.73 Because restricted stock units (as opposed to the
underlying stock) are not considered property, the § 83(b) election is not
available. 74 Firms issue restricted stock units as a means of deferring the
tax consequences of the transaction to the employee beyond the vesting
date to a later delivery date.75
r is the after-tax interest rate over the period that the stock is not vested. From the base
case, we know that the cost to the employee from the election measured at grant is
tpPo[(1 +r)/cc-I j. Therefore, when the increase in the employer's tax rate is sufficiently
large, it will offset the cost to the employee of electing. Specifically, this will occur when
(t,~f() > tp(tcc-I/(I+r».
70. If she makes the election, she includes Po at the date of grant and pays tax of foPo.
At vesting, she has (I-tcc}P I + fccPo. If the employee does not make the election, then she
will include PI at vesting and pay tax of t l PI' U she does not make the election, then to
equate her exposures, she buys (tl~fcc;)/(I-fcc;) shares and invests or borrows the excess, [tu
- (t l - tcc)/(1-tcc)]Pu. Thus, at vesting, she will have (I-fcc)?l + fcc [(t l-tcc)/(I-tcc)]Pu +
[to-(tl-tcc)/(l-tcc)]Po (1+r). The difference in net worth at vesting is [(I-tl)/(I-tcc)] tccPo +
[lo-(tI-tcc)/(l-tcc)]Po (l+r). The employee then is better off making the election when t l >
[lo(1 +r)(I-tcc)+tccrj(l-tcc)/(1+r-tcc;). This req uires t l > to.
71. Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Reshapes Compensation for Continued
Success (July 8, 2003), available at http://www.microsofr.com/presspass/press/2003/jul03/07-
08CompPR.mspx.
72. See LR.C. § 83 (2005).
73. [d. § 83(b), (h).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (for purposes of § 83, the term
property excludes unfunded and unsecured promises to pay property in the future).
75. Ine American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which made sweeping changes to de-
ferred compensation rules, imposed additional restrictions on using restricted stock units to
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Since the units also defer the employer's deduction, it might be thought
that it is more expensive for the firm to issue restricted stock units than
restricted stock. However, as long as the employer's stock is publicly
traded and its tax rate is constant, the employer is indifferent as to when
it takes its deduction. 111at is because the employer can offset the effect
of when it receives the deduction by trading in its own stock.76
Although the employer should be indifferent between issuing restricted
stock and restricted stock units, the employee enjoys an additional tax
benefit with the units. That is because the employee permanently escapes
tax on the appreciation that occurs before she is taxed on the grant.
Therefore, assuming that the employee sells her restricted stock units at
delivery, and assuming that she would have sold the restricted stock on
the same date, then the employee's incremental tax benefit from receiv-
ing restricted stock units instead of restricted stock is the avoidance of
capital gains taxes on the appreciation that occurs between vesting and
delivery.77 That benefit is also the parties' joint benefit because the em-
ployer's tax liability is not affected by the switch.78
3. FOJfeiture
The discussion above has ignored the possibility of the employee
forfeiting her restricted stock back to her employer. If an employee who
has not made a § 83(b) election forfeits her stock, she can claim an ordi-
nary loss for what, if anything, she paid for that stock.79 If, however, the
employee has made the § 83(b) election, and subsequently forfeits the
stock, then she cannot claim a loss for her basis in the stock nor can she
deduct the amount she previously included in income.so She can only
deduct the amount, if any, that she paid for the stock.sl Moreover, that
loss is now a capital loss, not an ordinary 10ss.82 Thus, the possibility of
forfeiture makes the election less attractive to employees for two reasons.
First, an employee who has made the election cannot deduct the amount
she previously included in income if she subsequently forfeits the stock.
defer taxes. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357. 118 Stat. 1418
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.s.C).
76. For example. if the firm issues restricted stock units. but would prefer the eash flow
pattern from restricted stock with otherwise identical terms (and without the election), it
can synthesize that pattern by selling I shares at vesting for tP j and repurchasing those
shares by using its tax savings at delivery.
77. A non-tax consequence of restricted stock units is that the units lock employees
iI1lO their employers stock for a longer time (from vesting to delivery) than the correspond-
ing stock. That will likely be seen as a cost to the employee and a benefit to the employer.
78. In terms of the numerical example. the incremental benefit from granting re-
stricted stock units on 100 shares on July I. 2004 that vest on July 1,2007, but which are not
delivered until July L 201 O. compared with granting restricted stock with the same terms
(and so are delivered when they vest on July 1.20(7) is that the employee permanently
escapes tax on the appreciation that occurs between July 1. 2007, and July 1,2010. on her
65 shares held after tax.
79. Treas. Reg. ~ 1.83-1 (b )(2) (as amended in 20(3).
SO. Jd.
S1. Jr!. ~ 1.83-2(8) (1978).
82. Jr!.
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Second. an employee who paid something for her stock (and receives less
than that amount back upon forfeit) has a capital loss, whereas an em-
ployee who did not make the election has an ordinary loss.
In contrast with the employee who forfeited her stock. the employer
who received a deduction because its employee made a § 83(b) election
has to include the previous deduction in income if the stock is forfeited.~3
If the employee did not make the election, there is no such inclusion.
Thus, on the employer's side there is a small tax benefit from the election
if there is a forfeiture. That benefit arises because the employer's deduc-
tion preceded its offsetting inclusion. Since the timing benefit to the em-
ployer is likely to be small, whereas the cost to the employee of the
election if there is a forfeiture is likely to be large, the possibility of forfei-
ture is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the election to the employer
and employee taken together.
4. Explicit Payments for the Stock
So far, the discussion in this part has assumed that the employee does
not pay anything to her employer in exchange for her restricted stock.
Although the overwhelming majority of employers do not require explicit
payments in consideration of their grants of restricted stock, some em-
ployers do require such payments. X4 This subpart thus extends the discus-
sion of the § 83(b) election by taking into account the possibility of the
employer charging the employee something (possibly, but not necessarily,
equal to the market value of the shares) in exchange for the shares. The
principal result that arises from this analysis is that when the employee
must make a payment, there can be a conflict of interest between the
employer and the employee over the desirability of making the § 83(b)
election.85
Denote by B, the amount the employee pays to her employer for one
share of restricted stock. So far, we have assumed B=O. If the employer
charges its employee the market price, then B=Po. If the employer sells
the stock to the employee at a discount, then O<B<Po.X6
a. Employer
Start with the employer. When the employee pays nothing for her
stock, the employer can offset the economic consequences of the § 83(b)
election by using the tax proceeds generated by the election to purchase
additional shares. When, however. the employee pays something for her
stock, the employer can no longer neutralize the economic effects of the
83. ld. § 1.83-6(c) (as amended in 2003).
84. See BLOUl & CARTER. supra note 33. at 12-13.
85. The discussion in this subpart treats the explicit payment as outside of the parties'
planning framework. That is obviously incomplete because the employer could charge
more for the shares and pay a higher salary to compensate. The issues raised by making
the payment explicit are discussed in Knoll, supra note 30.
86. I am not aware of any employers selling their stock as part of a restricted stock
program at a premium.
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employee's election. Instead, the election hurts the employer. The logic
behind that result is easiest to see when the employee pays the full mar-
ket price for the restricted stock (B=Po). In that case, if the employee
does not make the election, the employer will deduct the appreciation
that occurs between grant and vesting, (Pr-Po)t, which has a positive ex-
pected value. If, however, the employee makes the election, then the em-
ployer receives no tax deduction either at grant or vesting. Thus, when
the employee pays the full market price, the election harms the employer
by taking away the deduction for the appreciation that is expected to oc-
cur prior to vesting, PotR.
That same logic applies for any payment made by an employee to her
employer for restricted stock. If the employee pays B for one share, her
purchase can be decomposed into paying the fair market value for B!Po
shares and nothing for (Po-B)!Po shares. Since the election has no effect
on the employer when there is no explicit payment and prevents the em-
ployer from deducting the return until vesting when the employee pays
the fair market value, the effect of the election is to deny the employer a
deduction for the appreciation on the explicitly purchased portion of the
grant. lbus, the employer's cost can be expressed as Btr. In other words,
the cost to the employer of the election is losing its deduction (I) on the
anticipated return (R) on that portion of the stock paid for by the em-
ployee (B).
b. Employee
Turn now to the employee. She too finds that her view of the election
is changed by the introduction of a payment for the restricted stock. Not
surprisingly, the effect on the employee is the reverse of that on the em-
ployer. TIle election becomes more attractive to the employee the more
she pays. Once again, the result is easiest to see when the employee pays
the full market price. In that case, no immediate tax consequences arise
from the grant and election, and any subsequent price changes prior to
vesting (which have a positive expected value) are taxed at capital gains
rather than ordinary tax rates. Thus, when the employee purchases the
restricted stock at its fair market value, the election benefits the em-
ployee by reducing her tax on the appreciation that occurs through vest-
ing by the capital gain preference. We know from the discussion of the
base case that when she pays nothing for her shares, the election hurts the
employee by subjecting the appreciation on her after-tax shares to capital
gains taxes. Because any intermediate payment combines these two ef-
fects. the benefit to the employee of making the election, <6.(B), can be
written as:
(9)
The first term in equation (9) is the benefit to the employee of the elec-
tion and the second term is the cost. The cost is the tax paid by the em-
ployee on the (1-[p) shares that would have been tax exempt had the
employee not made the election. but which, as a result of the election. are
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now subject to capital gains taxes. The benefit is the after-tax return.
R( I-tee;) on the tax savings from the payment. (Bt,,).
Consider two special cases. First. if the employee pays nothing for the
stock (B=O), the cost to the employee of making the election becomes
-(l-tp)PoRtcc, which is the cost of the election as derived in the base
case.~7 Second, if the restricted stock is purchased at the market price
(B=Po), then the benefit to the employee from making the election be-
comes Po (tp-tcc;) R. That expression is readily amenable to an intuitive
explanation. The benefit is the employee's tax savings (the difference be-
tween ordinary income and capital gains rates, (tp-tcc) on the return from
holding the stock over the vesting period, PaR.
More generally, the parties will sometimes find that their private inter-
ests in the election conflict. For B>O, the employer is always worse off
with the election, and the employee might be better or worse off. Moreo-
ver, increasing B benefits the employee and harms the employer. Also,
the employee is definitely better off making the election when Po=B. Be-
cause there is a value for B, below Po, at which the employee benefits
from the election,88 such conflicts can arise for any set of tax rates with a
capital gains preference. Moreover, the conflict between the parties will
intensify as B increases beyond that point. Although for any set of tax
parameters with a capital gain preference there is always a range where
the employee benefits from the election, there is not always a range
(O-:;,B-:;,Po) where the parties jointly benefit from the election.
Whether it is ever in the joint interest of the parties for the employee to
make the § 83(b) election depends upon the parties' tax rates. If the em-
ployee's capital gains preference, tp-tcc, exceeds the employer's corpo-
rate tax rate, t (tp-tccJ > t), then there is a value for B (O-:;,B-:;,Po) above
which the parties jointly benefit from the election.89 The intuition is that
the benefit is the capital gain preference on appreciation between grant
and vesting and the cost is the loss of the corporate tax deduction on that
same return. If, however, the corporate tax rate exceeds the capital gain
preference (t > tp-tcc,), then it is never in the joint interest of the parties
for the employee to make the election.90 Thus, for employers at the top
statutory rate today, the election is never in the joint interest of the par-
ties. LJl For such firms, there is no tax benefit from making the election
87. See sllpra equation (8).
88. The employee benefits from the election whenever B>Pol(l-tp)/(l-tcc;)J[tcc1tp] ,
which will occur for a value of B less than Po whenever tp>tcc.
89. This can be seen by rcwriting the corporate tax rate. t, in tcrms of the capital gains
prefcrence. tp-fcc. Thus, f=tp-tcc.+d, where d is positive if the corporate tax rate exceeds
the capital gain preference. At the current maximum statutory rates. d is 15% because
.35[t] =.35[tp]-.15[tcc] +.15[d]. Thus, the net gain from making the election.
-BHBfl'(l-fu;)-Po(1-fp)fcc, can be rewritten and simplified as -Bd-(Po-B)tcc(1-tp). which
for d<O is obviously negative for B<::,Po.
90. The expression -Bd- (Po-B)tcc(l-tp) is positive for some value of B less than Po
(that is. there can be a net gain from making the election) when d is negative (indicating
that the corporate tax rate is less than the capital gains preference).
91. That is because the capital gains preference. 20%=35%-15%. is less than the cor-
porate tax rate, 35%.
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even if the payment is explicit.
5. Stock not Publicly Traded
In the base case, I repeatedly used the assumption that the employer's
stock was publicly traded to derive the results. Specifically, I showed that
the employer could offset both the tax and non-tax effects of the em-
ployee's § 83(b) election by investing its tax proceeds generated by the
employee's election in its own stock. Obviously, if the company cannot
trade its own stock, it cannot neutralize the cash Dow and capital struc-
ture consequences of the election.92 Accordingly, if the stock is not
traded, the employer must do something other than repurchase its out-
standing equity with the cash proceeds of the election. Under these cir-
cumstances, the employer will benefit from the election when its stock
declines (or increases by only a small amount), and it makes a good in-
vestment with the cash. 93 However, it is potentially misleading to de-
scribe any such gain or loss as a tax consequence of the election. It is
more accurate to describe the result as a non-tax consequence of the em-
ployer's issuance of additional stock through the election.94
In addition, if the employer's stock is not publicly traded, the employee
cannot increase her holdings of her employer's stock by purchasing more
shares. 95 If the employee cannot otherwise purchase shares, then the
only way she can effectively increase her share holdings is by making the
§ 83(b) election. Obviously, such an election will turn out well for the
employee when the stock appreciates substantially and poorly when it
does not. Once again, it seems misleading to describe whatever the result
is as a tax consequence instead of as a non-tax consequence of the em-
ployee's election.
As described above, when the employer's stock is not publicly traded,
the election does not have only tax consequences-it also has real conse-
92. I assume that the employer and employee cannot engage in private transactions
with other shareholders to offset the effect of the election. If they can, because there are
other willing parties with which to trade, the results are as in the base case.
93. The most reasonable and common assumption in the economic Jiterature is that
the employer can invest the funds in a project with an expected net present value of zero. J
ignore issues arising from the transfer of value between equity-holders and creditors if the
volatility of the new project does not match that of the firm. 'This phenomenon is called
asset suhstitution.
94. Viewed from this perspective, the assumption that the stock is not publicly traded
does not change the qualitative tax results-the election is still inefficient from a joint tax
perspective. TIle hypothetical transactions that I used to isolate the tax consequences of
the election were a heuristic designed to illustrate what, if any. was the tax cost of the
election by equalizing the non-tax consequences. Even if these transactions are not feasi-
ble. the logic of the exercise still applies and the tax consequences are still as they were
described above. TIle election exposes the appreciation that occurs prior to vesting to tax
and is therefore jointlv tax inefficient.
95. TIle employee might however he able to purchase additional shares from the em-
ployer. If so. then, as demonstrated for the base case above. the employee is better off
purchasing additional shares from the empJoyer than making. the election.
744 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
quences for both the employer and the employee.96 If the employer can-
not repurchase its own stock, the election will, in effect, increase the
number of shares the employer has outstanding, and it will increase the
cash the employer must invest somewhere. Similarly, if the employee
cannot buy additional shares of the employer's stock, then the election is
the only way she can increase her share holdings.'n
In effect, when the employee makes the § 83(b) election, she is forcing
the government to sell back to her some of the shares it holds through the
individual income tax system. As described above in the discussion of the
base case, the employee, in making the election, can be thought of as
purchasing tp shares from the government and subjecting her original
(l-t p) shares to capital gains tax. In addition, when the employee makes
the election, she is, by that action, forcing the employer to sell t shares to
the government. Obviously, if the employee's personal tax rate on ordi-
nary income and the employer's corporate tax rate are equal (tp=t), the
employer's sale of shares equals the employee's purchase, and the parties
are jointly worse off by the election, which exposes the original after-tax
grant to capital gains tax. Alternatively, if the employee's personal tax
rate exceeds the employer's corporate tax rate, the government is a net
seller of shares.98 Thus, if the personal tax rate exceeds the corporate tax
rate and the parties expect the firm's stock to appreciate sharply, then the
election might be attractive to the parties jointly.99
The most obvious example where the parties expect the stock to appre-
ciate substantially is when they report the value of the stock in an amount
less than its current market value. Such a possibility is not plausible when
the firm's stock is publicly traded, but it is when it is privately held. As-
sume the reported value of the stock is D, which might not equal the
market value Po. In order to hold the employer harmless for losing a
deduction on the difference between Po and D, which would be worth
(Po-D)t, assume the employer reduces the employee's salary at grant by
(Po-D)t/(l-t).IOO As a result, all of the benefits and costs of undervaluing
96. The employer should be thought of as the other shareholders (and possibly credi-
tors and other stakeholders) of the employer.
97. 1l1ere is an obvious potential for conflict between employer and employee when
the parties share expectations. If they expect the stock to sharply appreciate, the employer
is hurt by issuing more shares and the employee benefits by purchasing more shares. Con-
versely, if they both expect the stock to fail to keep pace with the market (appropriately
adjusted for risk), then the employer benefits by issuing more shares and the employee is
hurt by buying more shares.
98. Furthermore, if the employer's corporate tax rate exceeds the employee's personal
tax raLe, the government is a net purchase of shares.
99. Also, if the corporate rate exceeds the personal rate and the parties expect the
stock to underperform, the election might again be jointly attractive. The second possibil-
ity is remote both because given current statutory rates, there is little opportunity for I-II'
to be very large. and restricted stock is unlikely to be used as compensation when the
panics expect its price to fall.
100. The salary reduction exceeds the lost tax benefits by the factor 1/(1-1) because the
salary payment is deductible.
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the employer's stock and making the election go to the employee. IOI
When the stock was publicly traded, I derived the tax consequences of
the election by first eliminating all non-tax consequences through a series
of transactions. Such offsetting transactions would not be possible here,
because the stock by hypothesis is not publicly traded. That is why the
parties can claim that the stock's value is different than its market
value. 102 With that caveat, and solely in order to isolate the tax conse-
quences, assume that it is hypothetically possible for the employer and
employee to engage in such offsetting transactions at the market price
while simultaneously declaring a value different than the market value.
After such an exercise, the net benefit to the employee (and hence to the
parties jointly) from undervaluing the stock and making the election is
given by:
!'1(D}= (Po-D )(tp-tcc;) +Po(tp-tce)R-DtpR(l-tcc)-
(Po-D)t(l+r)(l-tp)/(l-t). (10)
The first term in equation (10) is the reduced tax on the undervalued
shares; the second term is the reduced tax on the appreciation; the third
term is the tax on the return from making the election; and the fourth
term is the salary adjustment. 103
Note that if the personal and corporate tax rates are equal, then it is
always costly for the parties to undervalue the employer's stock and make
the election. Thus, undervaluing the stock and making the election can
be a jointly attractive strategy only when the personal tax rate exceeds
the corporate rate. Accordingly, the tax benefit is at a maximum when
both t=O and D=O. In that case, equation (10) becomes Po (tp-lce) (1+R),
which has a ready interpretation. The maximum tax benefit from under-
valuing the employee's stock and making the election is the product of
the employee's capital gain preference and the expected value of the
stock at vesting. Given current statutory rates, that is 20% of the stock's
expected value at vesting. That gain can however be as large as 35% of
the stock's expected value if the employee can avoid the capital gain
tax. I04 Thus, when the employer is effectively untaxed, the parties can
generate a large tax benefit from undervaluing the employer's shares and
making the election. lOS
101. TIle parties might choose to share the benefit between employer and employee.
TIle assumption that the benefits redound to the employee is made to make the explana-
tion clearer.
102. If the stock were publicly traded, it simply would not be feasible to report a differ-
ent value under § 83.
103. 'ote that if Po=D, the first and last terms drop out leaving only the middle two
terms. Those terms simplify to the cost of the election in the base case, (l-t,,)PoRtC(;'
104. llle employee will avoid the capital gain tax if she holds the stock until her death
(I.R.C. § 1014(a)) or contributes the stock to charity (l.R.C. § 170).
105. Why then do such employcr"s explicitly sell their shares to employees? Because
the tax consequences arc the s(Jme when the employee makes the election. whether the
stock is priced explicitly or implicitly. there must be another reason. My guess is that a
"sale" is being used to support the claim that the price paid is the market price. However.
when sales are restricted and are part of a compensation package. such sales by themselves
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It is worth identifying the source of the parties' tax benefit from under-
valuing the shares and making the election. lhe economic effect of the
election is to force the government to sell some of its shares of the em-
ployer's stock to the employee at a below market price and to force the
employer to sell some shares of its stock to the government at the same
below market price. If the employer's tax rate is low enough relative to
the employee's, then the § 83(b) election will cause the government to
sell more shares to the employee than it purchases from the employer. In
that case, the benefit from the below-market transfers can exceed the cost
from subjecting the after-tax grant to capital gains tax. Under those cir-
cumstances, the employer and employee jointly benefit from the under-
valuation and election.
What about the incentive to either undervalue or overvalue the stock if
the employee does not make the § 83(b) election? Note that if the em-
ployee does not make the election, the value of the stock at the grant date
will not have any tax consequences for the parties. Thus, the question
becomes what incentives do the parties have for valuing the stock at
vesting?
Consider the price at vesting (assuming that the employee has not
made the § 83(b) election). For the employer, the only deduction it ever
gets on the stock occurs at vesting and is equal to tP]. Thus, every dollar
that the stock is undervalued costs the employer t. For the employee, the
result depends upon how long she plans to hold the stock. Every dollar
that the stock is undervalued converts a dollar of ordinary income into a
dollar of capital gain and defers that gain from vesting until sale. If we
denote the present value of the capital gains tax (as of the vesting date)
by t"'ce,106 the employee's saving is tp-t* CG. Thus, the joint benefit from
undervaluing the employer's stock at the vesting date is -t+tp-t*CG'
Hence, when t"'CG is close to the statutory tax rate (tp ) and the personal
and corporate tax rates are close together, the parties have an incentive
to overvalue rather than undervalue the stock at vesting. Alternatively,
when the employer's tax rate, t, is close to zero, there can be a strong
incentive for the parties to undervalue the employer's stock. As de-
scribed above, when the employer's tax rate is close to zero that can also
provide the parties with an incentive to make the § 83(b) election. 107
III. THE SECTION 83(b) ELECTION: THE OPTION TO WAIT
The discussion, so far, has ignored the option to wait contained within
§ 83(b). Section 83(b) allows the employee up to thirty days to make the
election. If the employee makes the election, she pays tax on the value of
the grant as of the grant date, which is in effect equivalent to purchasing
do not establish an independent market price. There is however an incentive to use artifi-
cially low prices when the employer's effective marginal tax rate is low or zero.
106. If the stock were sold at vesting, then l*CG equals (CG. If the statutory capital gains
tax rate is constant, then I*CG falls as the time until sale increases.
107. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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additional shares. The election thus contains an option element because
the new shares are not purchased at the market price at the time of the
election, but rather at the price as of the grant date. More specifically, by
making the election, the employee can purchase (tp-tcc)/(I-tcc) shares
for tpPo. That is equivalent to purchasing the additional shares at a per
share price of [1+tcc(1-tp)/(tp- tCG)]Po. Since that is obviously more than
Po (for tcc > 0), the option is initially out-of-the-money.l08
All option contracts require at least two parties: the party that holds
the option and the party that writes the option. The latter is often called
the counterparty because its cash flow from the option is the mirror im-
age of the first party's. With the § 83(b) election, the counterparty to the
employee is not the employer, but the government. When the employee
makes the election, the government, in effect, is forced to sell (tp-tcc)/
(I-tcc) shares back to the employee. That effective sale occurs because
the government reduces its tax rate on the employee's shares from the
ordinary tax rate to the capital gains tax rate. I 0<)
The employer has also written an option. Although triggered by the
employee's election, the employer's counterparty is not the employee,
but the government. Moreover, the option written by the employer does
not mirror the employee's held option, either in terms of the number of
shares covered or their stock price. The employer has written an option
to sell tp shares of the employer's stock for lpPo. Thus, the employer's
option is said to be at-the-money initially.110
As with any held call, the employee's optimal strategy is usually to hold
the option until right before it expires and then decide whether or not to
exercise. I I I Because the employee's option is initially out-of-the-money,
the price of the stock must rise for the employee to find its exercise desir-
able. If the stock price is below the exercise price when the option ex-
pires, the option will expire without ever being exercised. As with call
options generally, the option is more valuable the more volatile the price
of the underlying stock and the longer the time until expiration (which by
statute is no longer than thirty days).
How much is the thirty-day option worth to the typical employee?
Given current statutory tax rates, the strike price is roughly 50% above
the grant price. 112 Thus, for it to make sense for the employee to exercise
] 08. It is cheaper for the employee to purchase the shares directly on her personal
account than indirectly through the election because the election exposes the return on
(1-1,,) shares that would not have been taxed until vesting to capital gains taxes when they
are sold. It is thaI cost that accounts for the difference between the option's exercise price
and the market price of the stock at grant.
]09. T11e government originally obtained these shares through the tax system. By im-
posing a tax of I/' on the employee and including the grant within income at vesting, the
government in effect required the employee to transfer I" shares to it.
110. The difference in the strike prices goes to the federal government, which can tax
the return on (I-I,,) shares at the rate of ler; only if the employee makes the election.
111. The principal exception is when the stock pays dividends. which 1 have assumed
throughout this Article does no] occur.
IIi. -n1e strike price is [I+I/,J/(I,,-I({;)]P'J' For I, = (l.lS and 1/, = 0.35, the strike price is
1.4875 P".
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her option, the stock price must increase by roughly 50 cyo over the first
month. That is unlikely to occur often and so the value of the option to
wait before making the election is likely to be small. For example, a typi-
cal NASDAQ company has an annual volatility for its stock price of
about 60%.1 D The Black-Scholes value of a one month call option with a
strike price 50% above the current market price and an annual volatility
of 60% is less than .1 % of the share price. That is to say, a one-month
call option on one share with a current market price of $100, a strike price
of $150, and an annual volatility of 60%, is worth less than ten cents.
However, as the capital gains rate declines, the strike price falls. For
tCG=O, the option is issued at-the-money and any increase will suffice. Of
course, one way for the employee to reduce her capital gains tax rate,
which is the effective tax rate (not the statutory tax rate), is to extend her
holding period on the stock. If she plans to hold the stock until death (or
contribute it to charity), the appreciation is never taxed and so the effec-
tive capital gains tax rate is zero. For such a grantee, the value of the
option to wait is worth about 7% of the share price, or roughly $7 on each
share of $100 restricted stock.
What then are the practical implications of the insight that § 83(b) pro-
vides the employee with an option to wait? Given current statutory tax
rates, for many employees, that option is nearly valueless. Although em-
ployees could drive down their exercise prices by holding onto their stock
for long periods after vesting, there is a real economic cost to the em-
ployee in terms of increased exposure to the risks of holding her firm's
stock-a risk to which most employees are already overexposed. There
are however two groups who might find the option to wait valuable. The
first are members of the employer's board of directors, especially direc-
tors with substantial private wealth, who are employed elsewhere, and
who serve on numerous boards. Such people are better able to diversify
the risk from holding the additional shares for long periods of timeYl4
The second group consists of grantees who intend to contribute their
shares to charity. Because such stock is never subject to capital gains tax,
such an employee should treat the option as if it were granted at-the-
money.
Although I have not seen any hard data, it is my understanding that
most employers ignore the employee's option to wait. Given the option's
high strike price and short maturity, the employee's option has little value
in most cases. Nonetheless, for employers paying corporate income tax at
34% or 35%, the employee's option, if exercised, will usually cost the
113. Note however that anyone who planned to hold the stock indefinitely, would still
have to pay personal level capital gain tax if the employer was acquired in a taxable trans-
action. Thus, the holder is not assured of a zero tax rate.
114. The employer's cost and employee's benefit are equal when the employer's tax
rate equals the employee's capital gain preference, which for employers and employees in
their top statutory brackets requires that tcc=O.
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employer more than the employee benefits. lIS Thus, when viewed from a
joint perspective, the option to wait is generally harmful to the parties
taken together.
The employer has several alternatives available to it if it wants to rein
in the employee's option to wait.1 16 If the employer does not want to
transfer additional value to the employee, it could simply eliminate the
employee's option to wait by requiring the recipient to commit in ad-
vance of receiving her shares either to make the election or not,ll 7 Alter-
natively, if the employer's concern was not with transferring value to its
employee, but with the fact that much of that value goes to the govern-
ment,118 it could prohibit the employee from making the election (or at
least waiting to make the election) and offer to sell her a fixed amount of
additional shares anytime during the month at a set price. In effect, the
employer would write the option explicitly, not implicitly through the tax
law. That would create an additional benefit for the parties to share.
IV. Conclusion
Restricted stock is well on its way to becoming, along with ESOs, one
of the two dominant forms of equity-based pay. Yet in spite of both its
importance and prominence, little attention has been paid to the question
how firms should design their restricted stock grants in light of taxes. By
employing a joint parties perspective and separating tax from non-tax
consequences, I have begun to answer that question. Along the way, I
have identified one issue that has heretofore been ignored in the litera-
ture and expanded on another that has previously been identified, but
which was examined incompletely.119
First, I have looked at the employee's option under § 83(b) to treat the
grant as if it vests immediately for tax purposes. In contrast with prior
authors, who have considered this election solely from the perspective of
the employee, I have taken a joint perspective. Such a perspective is ap-
propriate because the employer can-as a condition of the grant-re-
quire, prohibit or otherwise restrict the election. Starting with the
employer, if there is no explicit payment for the restricted stock, the em-
ployer can offset both the tax and non-tax consequences of the em-
ployee's election by using the proceeds of the election to buy back its ovm
stock. In such circumstances, the tax consequences of the election to the
parties depends solely upon the consequences to the employee. For the
115. See Hall, supra note 1 for data on the volatility of stocks trading on different
exchanges.
116. Only if the employer"s tax rate is very low will the employee's tax benefit exceed
the employer"s cost.
] 17. This possibility is suggested by Treasury Regulation § 1.83-2(h) (1978) (stating that
the election may he filed prior to the date of transfer).
118. ]f the option is exercised, the employer loses more than the employee benefits (for
1(1,>0 and 1=1,,).
1] 9. I have also identified the issue whether the employer should charge the employee
for her restricted shares explicitlv or implicitlv. 11Mt issue is not discussed in this Article.
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employee, the election is undesirable because it exposes the after-tax
grant to tax from the vesting date. (In contrast, if the employee bought
shares directly, she could purchase the same number of shares for the
same amount without exposing her original grant to tax.) In such circum-
stances, the election does not make sense for the employee alone or the
parties jointly.
Second, I have identified the employee's option to wait thirty days
before making the § 83(b) election. For employees in or near the top
personal income tax bracket and who expect to pay capital gains taxes on
the grant in the not too distant future, the strike price is so high (about
150% of the grant price) that the option is likely to have little value.
However, for grantees who can avoid or at least substantially defer their
capital gain taxes, the strike price is close to the grant price and the op-
tion is worth about 7% of the grant for a typical NASDAQ company. In
addition, if the employer is paying taxes at 34% or 35%, the employer is
likely to lose more from the option if it is exercised than the employee
will gain.
Finally, most of the discussion in this Article-including the conclu-
sion-has been at the level of the trees. Looked at as a forest, the lesson
that should be drawn from this Article is that there can be significant
value added by integrating tax planning into the design of equity-based
pay programs. That, however, needs to be done carefully. It requires an
all-parties perspective. It also entails a counterfactual exercise that iso-
lates the tax consequences of an action through a series of hypothetical
transactions. Finally, it requires consideration of the non-tax conse-
quences of any action that cannot be eliminated. That is not how most
tax planners approach tax planning issues today, but it should be.
